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Abstract: For simple prospects routinely used for certainty equivalent elicitation, random
expected utility preferences imply a conditional expectation function that can mimic
deterministic rank dependent preferences. That is, a subject with random expected utility
preferences can have expected certainty equivalents exactly like those predicted by rank
dependent probability weighting functions of the inverse-s shape discussed by Quiggin
(1982) and advocated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), Prelec (1998) and other scholars.
Certainty equivalents may not nonparametrically identify preferences: Their conditional
expectation (and critically, their interpretation) depends on assumptions concerning the
source of their variability.
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Elicitation of certainty equivalents has become routine in laboratory measurement of
preferences under risk and uncertainty (Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Tversky and Fox
1995; Wu and Gonzales 1999; Gonzales and Wu 1999; Abdellaoui 2000; Abdellaoui,
Bleichrodt and Paraschiv 2007; Halevy 2007; Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper 2010; Vieider
et al. 2015). While elicitation methods vary across such studies, formal empirical
interpretations of elicited certainty equivalents are invariably the same. The subject is
assumed to have a unique and fixed preference order, implying (under unchanged
conditions of background wealth, risk and so forth) a unique and fixed certainty equivalent
for each prospect. Elicited certainty equivalents are then interpreted as this unique and
fixed certainty equivalent plus some error of banal origin with standard properties.
Such added error, or something like it, is necessary: In repeated elicitations using
exactly the same prospect, elicited certainty equivalents vary within subjects (Tversky and
Kahneman 1992, p. 306-308; Krahnen, Rieck and Theissen 1997, p. 477; von Winterfeldt et
al. 1997, p. 422; Gonzalez and Wu 1999, pp. 144-146; Pennings and Smidts 2000, p. 1342)
and other evidence also suggests inherent variability of elicited certainty equivalents (e.g.
Butler and Loomes 2007). Luce (1997, pp. 81-82) argued that theory and empirical
interpretation need to take a position on such response variability. Adding mean zero error
to an otherwise deterministic model of certainty equivalents is clearly one option here, and
I call this the standard model of an elicited certainty equivalent.
Random preference models are a well-known alternative to standard models. These
models assume that an individual subject’s preference order is a random variable, and that
each certainty equivalent elicited from that subject is fully determined by a single
realization of that random variable. Random preference models are both old and
contemporary, particularly in the realm of discrete choice (Becker, DeGroot and Marschak
1963; Eliashberg and Hauser 1985; Hilton 1989; Loomes and Sugden 1995, 1998;
Regenwetter and Marley 2001; Gul and Pesendorfer 2006; Regenwetter, Dana and DavisStober 2011; Ahn and Sarver 2013; Apesteguia and Ballester 2016; Karni and Safra 2016).
I examine implications of random preference models for elicited certainty equivalents
and find a significant complication of their empirical interpretation. Random model
expected utility preferences (or more simply random EU as Gul and Pesendorfer call it)
imply expected certainty equivalents that can mimic those implied by standard model rank1

dependent preferences (or more simply standard RDU). That is, a random EU subject can
have expected certainty equivalents that appear to reveal rank dependent probability
weighting functions of the inverse-s shape discussed by Quiggin (1982) and advocated by
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and other scholars.
Section 1 develops a standard RDU model and a random EU model of observed certainty
equivalents in formal econometric terms, separating both into a conditional expectation
function and an error term. Section 2 then develops parametric examples of the random EU
model that mimic standard RDU models: For example, Prelec (1998) weighting functions
will be derived from certainty equivalents governed by a specific random EU model.
Section 3 shows that a class of random EU models will display apparent underweighting of
high probabilities and apparent overweighting of low probabilities—just that pattern
implied by inverse-s probability weighting functions in a standard RDU model; and Section
4 provides brief graphical intuition for all the results. Contra widespread suggestions to the
contrary, I conclude that elicited certainty equivalents may not nonparametrically identify
preferences, since their conditional expectation (and critically, the interpretation of it)
depends on the source of their variability.
1. Certainty equivalents of simple prospects under Standard RDU and Random EU
Simple prospects (𝑊, 𝑝) deliver an outcome 𝑊 > 0 with probability 𝑝 and nothing with
probability 1 − 𝑝. Many scholars believe that observed certainty equivalents of simple
prospects reveal the probability weighting function of the rank-dependent preference
family when the utility or value of outcomes is linear or nearly so (e.g. Tversky and
Kahneman 1992; Prelec 1998). To see this, let the utility or value of outcomes 𝑧 have the
power form 𝑣(𝑧) = 𝑧1/𝑥 where 𝑥 ∈ (0, ∞): I write the power as 1/𝑥 for later convenience.
The rank dependent utility or RDU of (𝑊, 𝑝) is then 𝜋(𝑝|𝜔) ∙ 𝑊 1/𝑥 , where 𝜋(𝑝|𝜔) is a
probability weighting function depending on preference parameters 𝜔. The certainty
equivalent of (𝑊, 𝑝) is then 𝜋(𝑝|𝜔)𝑥 ∙ 𝑊, but one commonly divides this by 𝑊 to free it of
dependence on 𝑊 and calls 𝐶 𝑟𝑑 (𝑝|𝑥, 𝜔) ≡ 𝜋(𝑝|𝜔)𝑥 the RDU relative certainty equivalent of
a simple prospect. Notice that when 𝑥 = 1 (i.e. for a linear value of outcomes), one has
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𝐶 𝑟𝑑 (𝑝|1, 𝜔) ≡ 𝜋(𝑝|𝜔), so relative certainty equivalents of simple prospects are thought to
reveal RDU (or CPT) probability weighting functions when 𝑥 = 1. Expected utility or EU is
the special case where 𝜋(𝑝|𝜔) ≡ 𝑝, so also define 𝐶 𝑒𝑢 (𝑝|𝑥) ≡ 𝑝 𝑥 as the EU relative
certainty equivalent of any simple prospect (given specific 𝑥).
Let 𝑐𝑒 be the observed certainty equivalent for (𝑊, 𝑝) elicited from a subject, and let
𝑐 = 𝑐𝑒/𝑊 ∈ [0,1] be the observed relative certainty equivalent. 𝐸(𝑐|𝑝) is the expected
value of 𝑐 given the win probability 𝑝: Many econometricians call this the conditional
expectation function or c.e.f. of 𝑐. Defining an error as 𝜀 = 𝑐 − 𝐸(𝑐|𝑝), rearrangement gives
a general additive empirical specification for observed relative certainty equivalents, which
is 𝑐 = 𝐸(𝑐|𝑝) + 𝜀. A standard RDU model then assumes that the c.e.f. 𝐸(𝑐|𝑝) is the
theoretical one given by RDU, that is 𝐶 𝑟𝑑 (𝑝|𝑥, 𝜔) ≡ 𝜋(𝑝|𝜔)𝑥 , yielding the specification
𝑐 = 𝜋(𝑝|𝜔)𝑥 + 𝜀. Various estimations of (𝑥, 𝜔) may then proceed: Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and
Epper (2010) use maximum likelihood, while Tversky and Kahneman (1992) use nonlinear
least squares. In this model the error term 𝜀 is thought to arise from banal sources such as
“carelessness, hurrying, or inattentiveness” (Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper p. 1383).
Before continuing to the specification of a random EU model, note the following
important fact about standard RDU models of certainty equivalents. For many weighting
functions 𝜋(𝑝|𝜔), 𝑥 and 𝜔 cannot be wholly identified solely from the relative certainty
equivalents of simple prospects. For instance suppose 𝜋(𝑝|𝜔) is the 2-parameter Prelec
(1998) weighting function 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝛽[− 𝑙𝑛(𝑝)]𝛼 ) where 𝛼 and 𝛽 are strictly positive
parameters. Relative certainty equivalents of simple prospects will then be 𝐶 𝑟𝑑 (𝑝|𝑥, 𝛼, 𝛽) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑥𝛽[− 𝑙𝑛(𝑝)]𝛼 ), so clearly only 𝛼 and the product 𝑥𝛽 can be estimated from simple
prospects alone. Scholars know this quite well, so experimental designs meant to
separately estimate all three parameters from certainty equivalents must (and typically do)
contain at least some non-simple prospects (those containing at least two possible nonzero
outcomes). I focus on simple prospects because of their tractability and their simple
interpretation under standard RDU: 𝐶 𝑟𝑑 (𝑝|1, 𝜔) ≡ 𝜋(𝑝|𝜔), so relative certainty equivalents
of simple prospects reveal weighting functions at linear 𝑣(𝑧) (Tversky and Kahneman
1992; Prelec 1998). The Monte Carlo study in my appendix employs an experimental
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design (that of Gonzalez and Wu 1999) containing both simple and non-simple prospects,
and results of that study will echo the analytical results I show here for simple prospects.
In the general RDU case, a random preference model could take both 𝑥 and 𝜔 to be
realizations of nondegenerate random variables 𝑋 and 𝛺 within a subject. However,
existing random preference estimations (e.g. Loomes, Moffatt and Sugden 2002; Wilcox
2008, 2011) treat weighting function parameters 𝜔 as fixed within a subject, and
contemporary random preference theory seems to be confined to treatment of 𝑋 as
random only (e.g. Gul and Pesendorfer 2006; Apesteguia and Ballester 2016). Therefore, all
of my random preference analysis treats only 𝑥 as the realization of a random variable 𝑋;
and in any case, my random model analysis is mostly confined to the random EU case.
In any distinct elicitation trial, an independent random EU model, or simply random EU
for short, assumes that an independent and identically distributed realization 𝑥 of 𝑋 occurs
and fully determines the relative certainty equivalent 𝐶 𝑒𝑢 (𝑝|𝑥) = 𝑝 𝑥 . Assume that a
probability density function 𝑓(𝑥|𝜓) of 𝑋 with support (0, ∞) lies within a subject, with
parameters 𝜓 governing moments, location and/or scale. Then define ℂ𝑒𝑢 (𝑝|𝜓) as

(1)

∞

∞

ℂ𝑒𝑢 (𝑝|𝜓) ≡ 𝐸𝑋 [𝐶 𝑒𝑢 (𝑝|𝑥)] = ∫0 𝑝 𝑥 𝑓(𝑥|𝜓)𝑑𝑥 = ∫0 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑥𝜏)𝑓(𝑥|𝜓)𝑑𝑥.

The final integral in eq. 1 (which becomes useful later in Section 2) simply defines
𝜏 = −𝑙𝑛(𝑝) and rewrites 𝑝 𝑥 as 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑥𝜏). The function ℂ𝑒𝑢 (𝑝|𝜓) is the expected relative
certainty equivalent of a random EU subject for simple prospects (𝑊, 𝑝), given her
underlying p.d.f. 𝑓(𝑥|𝜓). We will have an empirical model 𝑐 = 𝐸(𝑐|𝑝) + 𝜉 of the same form
as the standard RDU model. However, the random EU c.e.f. is 𝐸(𝑐|𝑝) = ℂ𝑒𝑢 (𝑝|𝜓) as given
by eq. 1, and the error 𝜉 is simply defined as 𝑝 𝑥 − ℂ𝑒𝑢 (𝑝|𝜓). The eq. 1 definition implies
that these new errors 𝜉 also satisfy the usual properties (𝐸(𝜉) = 𝐸(𝜉|𝑝) = 0), so we have a
close resemblance between the random EU model 𝑐 = ℂ𝑒𝑢 (𝑝|𝜓) + 𝜉 and the standard RDU
model 𝑐 = 𝐶 𝑟𝑑 (𝑝|𝑥, 𝜔) + 𝜀 and can estimate both using the same variety of estimators.
To conclude this section, allow a brief digression on elicitation methods. There is
another way of thinking about the p.d.f. 𝑓(𝑥|𝜓) of 𝑋 in the Random EU model. Suppose an
experimenter uses some method 𝑀 to elicit certainty equivalents 𝑐𝑒 from a subject, figures
4

the relative certainty equivalents 𝑐 = 𝑐𝑒/𝑊, and computes 𝑥(𝑐, 𝑝) to solve 𝑝 𝑥 = 𝑐; that is,
let 𝑥(𝑐, 𝑝) ≡ 𝑙𝑛(𝑐)/𝑙𝑛(𝑝). Suppose that in repeated elicitations using method M, across
various values of 𝑝, the empirical c.d.f. of 𝑥(𝑐, 𝑝) is observed to be 𝐹̂𝑀 (𝑥|𝑝) which converges
to 𝐹𝑀 (𝑥|𝑝) as the sample of observations grows. If 𝐹𝑀 (𝑥|𝑝) is in fact independent of 𝑝 and
so just 𝐹𝑀 (𝑥), the variability of the relative certainty equivalents observed by the
experimenter could be interpreted as arising from a random EU model of the kind assumed
here, where a p.d.f. 𝑓𝑀 (𝑥|𝜓) is derived from 𝐹𝑀 (𝑥). This suggests ways in which one might
test versions of the random EU model (or versions of a random RDU model, and later I will
return to this), but also shows that the results here only require that elicitation methods
satisfy two key assumptions: (1) repeated trials using the method yield variability in
elicited certainty equivalents; and (2) this variability is consistent with the assumptions of
a random EU model—namely, that 𝐹𝑀 (𝑥) is independent of 𝑝. Neither assumption rules out
dependence of 𝑓(𝑥|𝜓) on the elicitation method 𝑀; and debates about the relative merits of
various elicitation methods need not impinge on these assumptions in any necessary way.
2. Parametric examples of random EU mimicry of standard RDU
The close resemblance between the standard RDU and random EU models suggests
two possible types of mimicry. First, since 𝐶 𝑟𝑑 (𝑝|1, 𝜔) ≡ 𝜋(𝑝|𝜔) in standard RDU, it will be
troubling if ℂ𝑒𝑢 (𝑝|𝜓) can “look like” a stereotypical 𝜋(𝑝|𝜔), that is, can have properties like
those that many scholars believe are empirically characteristic of RDU weighting functions.
I will refer to this as weak mimicry (of standard RDU by random EU). Second, it may happen
that for some well-known and specific 𝜋(𝑝|𝜔), there exists a specific 𝑓(𝑥|𝜓) such that
ℂ𝑒𝑢 (𝑝|𝜓) is a re-parameterization of 𝐶 𝑟𝑑 (𝑝|𝑥, 𝜔). To formally define what that means, let 𝐷
be the set of possible parameter vectors (𝑥, 𝜔), and let Ψ be the set of possible parameter
vectors 𝜓. Then suppose that, for some specific 𝑓(𝑥|𝜓), there exists a function 𝐻𝑓 : 𝐷 → Ψ
such that ℂ𝑒𝑢 [𝑝|𝐻𝑓 (𝑥, 𝜔)] ≡ 𝐶 𝑟𝑑 (𝑝|𝑥, 𝜔) ≡ 𝜋(𝑝|𝜔)𝑥 : Then one may say there is strong
mimicry (of standard RDU by random EU) for 𝑓(𝑥|𝜓). Notice that strong mimicry implies
weak mimicry but not vice versa.
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Since −𝑙𝑛(𝑝) > 0 ∀ 𝑝 ∈ (0,1), so that 𝜏 > 0 too, the final integral in eq. 1 is the onesided Laplace transform ℒ{𝑓}(𝜏) of the p.d.f. 𝑓(𝑥|𝜓)—provided it exists; and below I only
use p.d.f.s for which the existence and form of ℒ{𝑓}(𝜏) have been demonstrated and
derived by others. In such instances, these known Laplace transforms ℒ{𝑓}(𝜏) of a p.d.f.
𝑓(𝑥|𝜓) make it simple to derive various parametric examples of ℂ𝑒𝑢 (𝑝|𝜓), using the
relationship ℂ𝑒𝑢 (𝑝|𝜓) = ℒ{𝑓}[−𝑙𝑛(𝑝)]. Two examples follow.
Example 1. Suppose X has the Gamma p.d.f.
1

𝑓(𝑥|𝑘, 𝜃) =

Γ(𝑘)𝜃𝑘

𝑥 𝑘−1 𝑒𝑥𝑝(− 𝑥⁄𝜃 ) for 𝑥, 𝑘, and 𝜃 ∈ (0, ∞),

where Γ is the Gamma function.
It’s widely known that this has the Laplace transform ℒ{𝑓}(𝜏) = (1 + 𝜃𝜏)−𝑘 , implying that
(2)

ℂ𝑒𝑢 (𝑝|𝑘, 𝜃) = (1 − 𝜃𝑙𝑛(𝑝))−𝑘 .
Figure 1-A shows this Gamma c.e.f. for 𝑘 = 0.75 and 𝜃 =2.79. At these parameter

choices, it has the “inverse-s” shape many believe is characteristic of weighting functions
𝜋(𝑝|𝜔) and the fixed point 𝑝 ≈ 𝑒 −1 which is characteristic of Prelec’s (1998) 1-parameter
weighting function; so this is an instance of weak mimicry. One needs to say that this
Gamma c.e.f. can (not must) weakly mimic this characteristic shape. Figure 1-B shows the
Gamma c.e.f. for 𝑘 = 0.75 and 𝜃 =0.9: Here we see the “optimist” shape discussed by
Quiggin (1982), and also the plurality shape of individually estimated weighting functions
in Wilcox (2015). Such shape flexibility is also characteristic of 2-parameter weighting
functions found in the literature on RDU and CPT estimation where such flexibility is
usually regarded as a strength rather than a weakness (for estimation).
Similar examples may be given for any other parametric distribution with a Laplace
transform, but the next specific example leads to a particularly interesting result.
Example 2. Suppose 𝑋 has the (unshifted) Lévy p.d.f.
𝑓(𝑥|𝜆) =

𝜆
2√

−𝜆2

𝑥 −3⁄2 𝑒𝑥𝑝 ( 4𝑥 ) for 𝑥 and 𝜆 ∈ (0, ∞).
𝜋
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Figure 1-A. An Inverse-s Shaped Gamma Conditional Expectation Function
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Figure 1-B. An “Optimist” Shaped Gamma Conditional Expectation Function
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This has the Laplace transform ℒ{𝑓}(𝜏) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜆𝜏 1⁄2 ) (Gonzá lez-Velasco 1995, p. 537),
implying that
(3)

ℂ𝑒𝑢 (𝑝|𝛿) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝜆[−𝑙𝑛(𝑝)]1⁄2 ).

Earlier I noted that in the case of the Prelec (1998) 2-parameter weighting function,
𝐶 𝑟𝑑 (𝑝|𝑥, 𝛼, 𝛽) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑥𝛽[− 𝑙𝑛(𝑝)]𝛼 ). Clearly, this is identical to eq. 3 if we set 𝜆 = 𝑥𝛽 and
require that 𝛼 = 1⁄ . This is very close to being a case of strong mimicry, but not quite,
since eq. 3 can only mimic Prelec weighting functions when 𝛼 just happens to be 1⁄ .
Empirically, estimates of 𝛼 have a wider range than a small neighborhood of 1⁄ .
However, this result provides a strong and fruitful hint. The Lévy distribution is a
specific instance of the Lévy Alpha-Stable distributions, also known simply as the Stable
distributions. Except for special cases (Normal, Cauchy and Lévy), Stable random variables
𝑋 have no p.d.f. expressible in terms of elementary functions. However, their Laplace
transforms exist as relatively simple expressions. For Stable random variables with support
(0, ∞), Nolan (2018, p. 109) shows that the Laplace transform exists and is ℒ{𝑓}(𝜏) =
𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−𝛾 𝛿 (𝑠𝑒𝑐

𝛿𝜋
2

) 𝜏 𝛿 }, where 𝛾 > 0 is a scale parameter and 𝛿 ∈ (0,1) is called the index of

stability or characteristic exponent (see Feller 1971 and Hougaard 1986 for similar forms
parameterized differently). Therefore, for Stable distributions of 𝑋 on (0, ∞), we have

(4)

ℂ𝑒𝑢 (𝑝|𝛿, 𝛾) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝 {−𝛾 𝛿 (𝑠𝑒𝑐

𝛿𝜋
2

) [−𝑙𝑛(𝑝)]𝛿 }.

Eq. 4 is identical to 𝐶 𝑟𝑑 (𝑝|𝑥, 𝛼, 𝛽) = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(−𝑥𝛽[− 𝑙𝑛(𝑝)]𝛼 ) when we set 𝛿 = 𝛼 and set
𝛾 = [𝛽𝑥 (𝑐𝑜𝑠

𝛼𝜋

1/𝛼

)]
2

, so a random EU model based on a Stable distribution of 𝑋 strongly

mimics standard RDU with the 2-parameter Prelec (1998) function—provided that 𝛼 < 1.
Since this is both characteristic of most empirical estimates of 𝛼 and indeed yields the
characteristic inverse-s shape, this is strong mimicry of a well-known and widely used
probability weighting function in the relevant part of the parameter space.
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3. A general result
A general result can be proved for a class of random EU models. Return to the more
usual way of writing the power utility or value function, specifically 𝑣(𝑧) = 𝑧 𝜎 , thinking
now of the power 𝜎 as having some probability distribution within the subject, and make
the following two assumptions.
Assumption One. The subject’s distribution of 𝜎 is non-degenerate and has a bounded
support Σ ⊂ (0, ∞). Specifically, 𝜎 = 𝑖𝑛𝑓(Σ) > 0 and 𝜎 = 𝑠𝑢𝑝(Σ) is finite.
Assumption Two. The expected value of 𝜎 exists and is unity, that is 𝐸(𝜎) = 1.
Assumption Two is meant to reflect a frequent (but by no means universal) finding when
standard RDU or standard CPT models are estimated from certainty equivalents, namely,
that estimated utility or value functions 𝑣(𝑧) are very nearly linear or at best very mildly
concave (see e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1992; Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper 2010).
Under Expected Utility, the relative certainty equivalent of a simple prospect (given
any value of 𝜎) will be 𝑝1⁄𝜎 , whose second derivative with respect to 𝜎 is

(5)

𝜕2
𝜕𝜎2

𝑝1⁄𝜎 =

−𝑙𝑛(𝑝)𝑝1⁄𝜎
𝜎4

[− 𝑙𝑛(𝑝) − 𝜎] > 0 for all 𝑝 < 𝑒𝑥𝑝(− 𝜎).

Define 𝑝 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(− 𝜎). By Assumption One, 0 < 𝑝 < 𝑒𝑥𝑝(− 𝜎) ∀ 𝜎 ∈ Σ. Therefore, eq. 5
shows that for any 𝑝 < 𝑝, 𝑝1⁄𝜎 is strictly convex in 𝜎 ∀ 𝜎 ∈ Σ. Jensen’s Inequality then
implies that 𝐸(𝑝1⁄𝜎 ) > 𝑝1⁄𝐸(𝜎) . Since 𝐸(𝜎) = 1 by Assumption Two, we have 𝐸(𝑝1⁄𝜎 ) > 𝑝
for sufficiently small 𝑝. That is: If Σ is bounded above and 𝐸(𝜎) = 1 (the mean value
function 𝑣(𝑧) is linear), mean relative certainty equivalents of simple prospects will exceed
𝑝 when 𝑝 is low enough. We have apparent overweighting of low enough probabilities.
Similarly, define 𝑝 = 𝑒𝑥𝑝(− 𝜎). By Assumption One, 1 > 𝑝 > 𝑒𝑥𝑝(− 𝜎) ∀ 𝜎 ∈ Σ.
Therefore, eq. 5 shows that for any 𝑝 > 𝑝, 𝑝1⁄𝜎 is strictly concave in 𝜎 ∀ 𝜎 ∈ Σ. Jensen’s
9

Inequality then implies that 𝐸(𝑝1⁄𝜎 ) < 𝑝1⁄𝐸(𝜎) . Since 𝐸(𝜎) = 1 by Assumption Two, we
have 𝐸(𝑝1⁄𝜎 ) < 𝑝 for sufficiently high 𝑝. That is: If Σ is bounded below away from zero and
𝐸(𝜎) = 1 (the mean value function 𝑣(𝑧) is linear), mean relative certainty equivalents of
simple prospects will be less than 𝑝 when 𝑝 is high enough. We have apparent
underweighting of high enough probabilities. The following proposition has been proved.
Proposition: Suppose that a subject’s utility or value of money is 𝑣(𝑧) = 𝑧 𝜎 , that this
subject’s behavior is described by an independent random EU model where the
subject’s distribution of 𝜎 satisfies Assumptions One and Two. Then:
(1) ∃ 𝑝 > 0 | 𝐸(𝑝1⁄𝜎 ) > 𝑝 ∀ 𝑝 < 𝑝 (apparent overweighting of sufficiently low
probabilities); and
(2) ∃ 𝑝 < 1 | 𝐸(𝑝1⁄𝜎 ) < 𝑝 ∀ 𝑝 > 𝑝 (apparent underweighting of sufficiently high
probabilities).
Notice that the assumptions behind the proposition are only sufficient conditions: The
parametric examples of Section 2 involve p.d.f.s with support (0, ∞) (neither bounded
above nor bounded below away from zero, as Assumption One requires).
4. Graphical intuition
Figure 2 provides some graphical intuition behind . Assume that the random EU
subject has a binomial distribution of 𝜎 such that 𝐸(𝜎) = 1: Specifically she has 𝜎 = 1/3
with probability 3⁄4 and 𝜎 = 3 with probability 1⁄4. Figure 2 shows the function 𝑝1⁄𝜎 for
𝜎 ∈ (0,3], given two values of 𝑝. The upper heavy curve is for 𝑝 = 0. 5 and, as can be seen,
this curve is overwhelmingly and strongly concave: In this case, 𝐸[0. 5(1⁄𝜎) ] < 0. 5, so this
subject appears to underweight the high probability 0.95. The lower heavy curve is for
𝑝 = 0.05 and, as can be seen, this curve is first convex and, for 𝜎 beyond about 1.5, very
gently concave: Here, 𝐸[0.05(1⁄𝜎) ] > 0.05, so this subject also appears to overweight the
low probability 0.05. This graphical intuition suggests why one may easily derive the
characteristic inverse-s shape from many p.d.f.s 𝑓(𝑥|𝜓) underlying a random EU model.
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Figure 2. Behavior of relative certainty equivalents as 𝜎 varies, at low and high 𝑝
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5. Discussion and conclusions
My results complicate interpretation of elicited certainty equivalents. However, I say
‘complicate’ rather than ‘undermine’ for several reasons. First, I have not shown that
random preference EU and standard RDU certainty equivalents are indistinguishable. The
formal results are entirely about conditional expectations and say nothing about
conditional medians or conditional variances and other moments; and one might test both
random EU and random RDU on the basis of these other characteristics.
For instance, recall that 𝐶 𝑟𝑑 (𝑝|𝑥, 𝜔) ≡ 𝜋(𝑝|𝜔)𝑥 and suppose we now assume that 𝑥 is a
realization of a random variable 𝑋, giving the simplest version of a random RDU model. Let
𝐶𝑉 denote coefficient of variation; then under random RDU, assuming that any weighting
function parameters are fixed (not themselves random variables), we have
11

(6)

𝐶𝑉(− 𝑙𝑛(𝑐)) ≡

√𝑉(− 𝑙𝑛(𝑐))
𝐸(− 𝑙𝑛(𝑐))

=

√𝑉(𝑋)[−𝑙𝑛(𝜋(𝑝|𝜔))]2
𝐸(𝑋)[−𝑙𝑛(𝜋(𝑝|𝜔))]

=

√𝑉(𝑋)
𝐸(𝑋)

= 𝐶𝑉(𝑋)

This says that for any given subject, the coefficient of variation of −𝑙𝑛(𝑐) will be equivalent
to the coefficient of variation of 𝑋 and, moreover, independent of the particular W and 𝑝 of
any simple prospect (𝑊, 𝑝), regardless of whether the weighting function is an identity
function (EU) or not (RDU). This immediately suggests a test of both random preference EU
and RDU based on multiple (more than two) certainty equivalent elicitation trials for
several different simple prospects. To my knowledge, such data are scarce but more could
be gathered with appropriate experimental designs. The key point, however, is that for
certainty equivalents, the random preference hypothesis can make strong refutable
predictions about moments (here, a ratio of moments) that are independent of the form or
even the presence of any rank-dependent weighting function.
Second, discrete choice experiments already suggest that random EU cannot be a
complete model of discrete choices (e.g. Loomes and Sugden 1998). Under the random
preference hypothesis, much of what EU predicts concerning pairs of related discrete
choice problems remains unchanged relative to what EU predicts in its deterministic form
(Loomes and Sugden 1995; Gul and Pesendorfer 2006; Wilcox 2008). This implies that
many well-known discrete choice violations of EU also violate random EU. Here I showed
once more (see Hilton 1989) that certainty equivalents are a different matter: Under
random EU, the expected values of certainty equivalents can mimic predictions of standard
RDU and CPT. The upshot of this fact is that when one estimates risk models from certainty
equivalents, part of the estimates (perhaps substantial parts) may reflect random
preference heterogeneity as well as any underlying mean preference.
Third, my results only complicate estimation based on conditional expectation
functions. While this is the overwhelmingly common basis for estimation, some of the
empirical literature on RDU and CPT uses pooled sample conditional medians of certainty
equivalents for description (Tversky and Kahneman 1992, pp. 309-311; Gonzalez and Wu
1999, p. 144-145). It may be that conditional median estimation (that is, least absolute
deviation or LAD estimators) can solve the problem uncovered here. Recall the key role
played by Jensen’s Inequality in Section 3’s general result: There is no counterpart of
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Jensen’s Inequality for medians. No subject-level conditional median estimations (based on
elicited certainty equivalents, using LAD estimation) of either RDU or CPT models are
available. (Tversky and Kahneman 1992 do estimate a pooled sample weighting function
from pooled sample conditional medians, but using a nonlinear least squares estimator.)
My appendix looks at a LAD estimator and finds encouraging results for random EU data,
but not for standard model EU data. I know of no estimator that correctly identifies
weighting functions regardless of the true probabilistic model generating the data; finding
such an estimator would be a nice contribution to decision research.
However, meaningful preference measurement may not be possible without strong
assumptions concerning the random part of decision behavior (Wilcox 2008; Blavatskyy
and Pogrebna 2010; Wilcox 2011; Apesteguia and Ballester 2016). Some say that elicited
certainty equivalents permit “nonparametric” (or “parameter-free”) identification and
estimation of preferences (Gonzales and Wu 1999; Abdellaoui 2000; Bleichrodt and Pinto
2000; Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt and Paraschiv 2007) and many others repeat it (e.g. Prelec
1998; Luce 2000; Nielson 2003; Fox and Poldrack 2009; Wakker 2010). “Nonparametric”
means many different things, but many econometricians divide discussion of models in two
parts: (1) a conditional expectation function, or perhaps a conditional median function, and
(2) the error, the random part that remains once such a function has been removed in a
way that makes the expectation (or median) of the error zero. In the preference
measurement literature, scholars who say their estimation is “nonparametric” (or
“parameter-free”) mean they are making few or no assumptions about the form of
preference entities (utilities or values, and probability weights, and so forth) that appear in
standard model conditional expectation functions. However, they routinely make the
strong assumption of the standard model itself, and an old and well-developed alternative
(the random preference model) has complicating consequences.
The essence of the standard model assumption is that the c.e.f. has an obvious
interpretation—the intended interpretation being that of algebraic (deterministic) decision
theory. Hendry and Morgan (2005, p. 23) argue that when we speak of model identification,
we have things in mind beyond the original Cowles Foundation meaning—including
“correspondence to the desired entity” and “satisfying the assumed interpretation (usually
of a theory model).” Estimation of preferences from elicited certainty equivalents is
13

complicated in just these senses. The standard model is but one probabilistic model
assumption, and under a venerable and contemporary alternative—the random preference
model—the c.e.f. in part reflects the underlying distribution of preferences within the
subject, in ways that can mimic “the desired entity,” the preference entity called the
probability weighting function. I do not know whether certainty equivalents can
nonparametrically identify such entities: This question needs a good answer. However, at
this time there is certainly no rigorous reason to think elicited certainty equivalents free
scholars of critical interpretive assumptions. As is true of discrete choices, it seems we
choose a probabilistic model the moment we interpret certainty equivalents.
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Appendix: A brief Monte Carlo illustration of the problem
Simulated data sets for this brief Monte Carlo analysis of several estimation methods
are based on the experimental design of Gonzalez and Wu (1999). Certainty equivalents
were elicited from their subjects for 𝑡 = 1, , … , 165 distinct two-outcome prospects
(𝑝𝑡 , ℎ𝑡 ; 1 − 𝑝𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡 ). These were constructed by fully crossing fifteen distinct pairs of high and
low outcomes (ℎ𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡 ) with eleven distinct probabilities 𝑝𝑡 of receiving the high outcome ℎ𝑡
(and corresponding probabilities 1 − 𝑝𝑡 of receiving the low outcome 𝑙𝑡 ). The eleven
probabilities are 𝑝𝑡 ∈ {.01, .05, .10, . 5, .40, .50, .60, .75, . 0, . 5, .

}; and the fifteen high and

low outcome pairs are (ℎ𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡 ) ∈ {( 5,0), (50,0), (75,0), (100,0), (150,0), ( 00,0), (400,0),
(800,0), (50, 5), (75,50), (100,50), (150,50), (150,100), ( 00,100), ( 00,150)}. These
same 165 prospects (88 simple prospects and 77 non-simple prospects) are the “input” to
the simulated subjects I create in the Monte Carlo data sets. Let 𝑍 = {0, 5, 50, … ,800}
denote the set of the nine distinct outcomes found in these 165 prospects.
Each simulated subject 𝑠 = 1, , … 1000 in the first data set is given a random EU
certainty equivalent for each of the 165 prospects. Each subject 𝑠 is endowed with
parameters 𝑘 𝑠 and 𝜃 𝑠 of the Gamma distribution p.d.f. as given in Example 1 of Section 2.
The parameter 𝑘 𝑠 is drawn once for each subject from a Lognormal distribution with mean
𝐸(𝑘) = 0.75 and variance V(𝑘) ≈ 0.16. The parameter 𝜃 𝑠 is then chosen (given the drawn
𝑠

𝑘 𝑠 ) so that ℂ𝑒𝑢 (𝑒 −1 |𝑘 𝑠 , 𝜃 𝑠 ) = (1 + 𝜃 𝑠 )−𝑘 = 𝑒 −1 . This endows each simulated subject 𝑠 with
a random EU c.e.f. having the fixed point 𝑒 −1 , as is characteristic of the 1-parameter Prelec
(1998) weighting function, but also creates heterogeneity in the degree of curvature of
subjects’ c.e.f.s. Then for each subject 𝑠, 𝑡 = 1, , … ,165 values 𝑥𝑡𝑠 are independently drawn
from the Gamma distribution with that subject’s parameters 𝑘 𝑠 and 𝜃 𝑠 . These create the
𝑠

𝑠

165 simulated elicited certainty equivalents 𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 = [𝑝𝑡 ℎ𝑡 1/𝑥𝑡 + (1 − 𝑝𝑡 )𝑙𝑡 1/𝑥𝑡 ]

𝑥𝑡𝑠

for each

subject s. Repeating this 1000 times yields the “random EU” data set.
For comparison, I create a second data set of 1000 simulated subjects who are given
standard EU certainty equivalents for each of the 165 prospects. Each simulated subject s is
endowed with a fixed value 𝑥 𝑠 , drawn once for each subject from a Gamma distribution
with the parameters 𝑘 = 0.75 and 𝜃 = .7 . For each subject 𝑠, this 𝑥 𝑠 then creates 165
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𝑠

𝑠

𝑥𝑠

expected certainty equivalents 𝐸(𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 ) = [𝑝𝑡 ℎ𝑡 1/𝑥 + (1 − 𝑝𝑡 )𝑙𝑡 1/𝑥 ] : These are standard
EU c.e.f.s, and one must somehow add standard model errors to them. To do this, notice
that each expected certainty equivalent may be rewritten as a proportion of the interval
[𝑙𝑡 , ℎ𝑡 ], that is as ∆𝑡𝑠 = (𝐸(𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 ) − 𝑙𝑡 )⁄(ℎ𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡 ). One may then interpret this proportion as the
mean of a Beta distribution on the interval (0,1) and define parameters of that Beta
distribution as 𝛼𝑡𝑠 = 𝜛∆𝑡𝑠 and 𝛽𝑡𝑠 = 𝜛(1 − ∆𝑡𝑠 ). (Beta distributions may be parameterized in
terms of their mean ∆ ∈ (0,1) and an inverse dispersion parameter 𝜛 > 0, from which their
more usual parameterization 𝛼 ≡ 𝜛∆ and 𝛽 ≡ 𝜛(1 − ∆) may be had. I chose 𝜛 = 6 to give
the resulting simulated certainty equivalents 𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 in this simulated Standard EU data
conditional variances resembling those found in the simulated Random EU data.) Then one
may draw a beta variate 𝑦𝑡𝑠 on (0,1) using these parameters, and the simulated certainty
equivalents with their standard model error become 𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝑙𝑡 + (ℎ𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡 )𝑦𝑡𝑠 .
I consider four estimation methods. The first two methods use a standard RDU model
of the c.e.f. of the 𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 , that is 𝐸(𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 |𝑣 𝑠 , 𝑤 𝑠 ) = (𝑣 𝑠 )−1 [𝑤 𝑠 (𝑝𝑡 )𝑣 𝑠 (ℎ𝑡 ) + (1 − 𝑤 𝑠 (𝑝𝑡 ))𝑣 𝑠 (𝑙𝑡 )];
the corresponding empirical model is then 𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 = 𝐸(𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 |𝑣 𝑠 , 𝑤 𝑠 ) + 𝜀𝑡𝑠 . I make the standard
assumptions about the error, those being 𝐸(𝜀𝑡𝑠 ) = 𝐸(𝜀𝑡𝑠 |𝑝𝑡 , ℎ𝑡 , 𝑙𝑡 ) = 0, but also adopt the
assumption of Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper (2010) that 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀𝑡𝑠 ) is proportional to
(ℎ𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡 )2 for each subject. (This assumption happens to be true for the simulated Standard
EU data.) This implies a “weighted error” 𝜖𝑡𝑠 = [𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 − 𝐸(𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 |𝑣 𝑠 , 𝑤 𝑠 )]⁄(ℎ𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡 ), and the first
two estimation methods optimize a function of these weighted errors.
The first estimation method combines a nonlinear least squares estimator with lean 1𝑠

𝑠

𝑠

1/𝛾𝑠

parameter forms of the functions 𝑤 𝑠 and 𝑣 𝑠 , 𝑤 𝑠 (𝑝) = 𝑝𝛾 ⁄[𝑝𝛾 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾 ]

and

𝑠

𝑣 𝑠 (𝑧) = 𝑧 𝜎 . This is the estimation method of Tversky and Kahneman (1992): I’ll call it
NLS-M-L (for “nonlinear least squares, money errors, lean parameterization”). The second
𝑠

estimation method combines a maximum likelihood estimator with the same 𝑣 𝑠 (𝑧) = 𝑧 𝜎 ,
𝑠

𝑠

𝑠

but a more expansive 2-parameter weighting function 𝑤 𝑠 (𝑞) = 𝛿 𝑠 𝑝𝛾 ⁄[𝛿 𝑠 𝑝𝛾 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛾 ].
The weighted error 𝜖𝑡𝑠 is assumed to have a Normal distribution with zero mean and
constant variance. This estimation method is inspired by Bruhin, Fehr-Duda and Epper
(2010), but I will always estimate at the individual subject level whereas they estimated
20

finite mixture models of the subject population and included prospect-specific error
variance terms (which cannot be done in the case of subject-level estimation). I’ll call this
method ML-M-C (for “maximum likelihood, money errors, common parameterization”).
The power utility function, combined with some 2-parameter weighting function, is quite
common in the literature on risk preference estimation.
The third method writes an estimating equation in utility rather than money terms,
and the parameterizations of 𝑣 𝑠 and 𝑤 𝑠 are maximally expansive. There are nine distinct
outcomes in 𝑍, so there are nine distinct values of 𝑣 𝑠 (𝑧). Since the RDU value function is an
interval scale, one can choose 𝑣 𝑠 (0) = 0 and 𝑣 𝑠 (800) = 1, leaving seven unique and
distinct values of 𝑣 𝑠 (𝑧) as seven parameters to estimate. Similarly, the eleven distinct
probabilities in the experiment become eleven distinct parameters 𝑤 𝑠 (𝑝𝑡 ) to estimate. Now
linearly interpolate 𝑣 𝑠 (𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 ) from the parameters 𝑣 𝑠 (𝑧) in the following manner. Let
𝑙𝑢𝑏(𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 ) = mi

𝑧∈𝑍

𝑧 | 𝑧 ≥ 𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 and 𝑔𝑙𝑏(𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 ) = max𝑧∈𝑍 𝑧 | 𝑧 ≤ 𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 be the least upper bound

and greatest lower bound (among the nine outcomes in the experiment) on 𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 , with values
given by the parameter values 𝑣 𝑠 (𝑙𝑢𝑏(𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 )) and 𝑣 𝑠 (𝑔𝑙𝑏(𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 )). Then define
𝑣̃ 𝑠 (𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 ) =

[𝑙𝑢𝑏(𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 )−𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 ]𝑣 𝑠 (𝑔𝑙𝑏(𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 ))+[𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 −𝑔𝑙𝑏(𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 )]𝑣 𝑠 (𝑙𝑢𝑏(𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 ))
𝑙𝑢𝑏(𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 )−𝑔𝑙𝑏(𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 )

,

a linear interpolation of 𝑣 𝑠 (𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 ). This estimation method then assumes that the c.e.f. of
𝑣̃ 𝑠 (𝐶𝑡𝑠 ) is the RDU of prospect 𝑡, that is 𝐸(𝑣̃ 𝑠 (𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 )|𝑣 𝑠 , 𝑤 𝑠 ) = 𝑤 𝑠 (𝑝𝑡 )𝑣 𝑠 (ℎ𝑡 ) + (1 −
𝑤 𝑠 (𝑝𝑡 ))𝑣 𝑠 (𝑙𝑡 ), and one may then think of 𝑣̃ 𝑠 (𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 ) − 𝐸(𝑣̃ 𝑠 (𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 )|𝑣 𝑠 , 𝑤 𝑠 ) as a “utility error.”
Following Wilcox (2011), assume the variance of these utility errors is proportional to
[𝑣 𝑠 (ℎ𝑡 ) − 𝑣 𝑠 (𝑙𝑡 ) ]2 . Then 𝜁𝑡𝑠 = [𝑣̃ 𝑠 (𝐶𝑡𝑠 ) − 𝐸(𝑣̃ 𝑠 (𝐶𝑡𝑠 )|𝑣 𝑠 , 𝑤 𝑠 )]⁄[𝑣 𝑠 (ℎ𝑡 ) − 𝑣 𝑠 (𝑙𝑡 ) ] is a weighted
utility error that becomes the object of nonlinear least squares estimation. I call this the
NLS-U-E estimation (for “nonlinear least squares, utility errors, expansive
parameterization”). It is inspired by Gonzalez and Wu’s (1999) estimation method, though
there are several differences between their method and this one (see Gonzalez and Wu
1999, pp.146-148, for details).
Finally, I consider an estimation method that may sidestep the issue identified in the
text. Rather than taking (𝑣 𝑠 )−1 [𝑤 𝑠 (𝑝𝑡 )𝑣 𝑠 (ℎ𝑡 ) + (1 − 𝑤 𝑠 (𝑝𝑡 ))𝑣 𝑠 (𝑙𝑡 )] to be the conditional
mean of 𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 , this last estimation method takes this to be the conditional median of 𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 :
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That is, let 𝑀𝑒𝑑(𝑐𝑒𝑡𝑠 |𝑣 𝑠 , 𝑤 𝑠 ) = (𝑣 𝑠 )−1 [𝑤 𝑠 (𝑝𝑡 )𝑣 𝑠 (ℎ𝑡 ) + (1 − 𝑤 𝑠 (𝑝𝑡 ))𝑣 𝑠 (𝑙𝑡 )], and let
weighted money errors be 𝜖𝑡𝑠 = [𝐶𝑡𝑠 − 𝑀𝑒𝑑(𝐶𝑡𝑠 |𝑣 𝑠 , 𝑤 𝑠 )]⁄(ℎ𝑡 − 𝑙𝑡 ). Although these errors
have exactly the same form as the errors in the first two methods, the fact that we wish to
estimate a conditional median function (rather than a c.e.f.) implies that least squares is not
the appropriate estimator: Rather, we want a least absolute deviation or LAD estimator.
Combined with the same lean parameterization used for the first method, I call this the
LAD-M-L estimation (for “least absolute deviation, money errors, lean parameterization”).
With the exception of the NLS-U-E estimation method, the well-known simplex
algorithm of Nelder and Mead (1965) was used to optimize objective functions. For the
NLS-U-E estimation method, I imposed monotonicity constraints on the estimated 𝑣 𝑠 (𝑧)
and 𝑤 𝑠 (𝑝𝑡 ) (one difference versus Gonzalez and Wu 1999) and this requires a different
optimization algorithm: Powell’s (1992) COBYLA algorithm is used for this estimation
instead. All estimations were performed using the SAS procedure “NLP” (nonlinear
programming) in the SAS 9.4 version of the SAS/OR software.
Rather than providing tabular results of these four estimation methods as applied to
the two data sets, I provide a sequence of eight figures. The features of each figure are
identical. Estimated weighting functions for the first 250 subjects in each data set are
plotted as quite thin, light greyscale lines on a black background: This has the effect of
representing the behavior of each method as a light cloud of lines. A heavy light grey
identity line shows the (linear, identity) weighting function of an EU subject; deviations
from this line represent both sampling variability and possible bias in the estimations.
Finally, a heavy dashed white line plots the mean estimated probability weight (across all
1000 subjects in each simulated data set) at each of the eleven values of 𝑝𝑡 in the
experimental design: Since all simulated subjects in both data sets are EU subjects with
identity weighting functions, deviations of this heavy dashed white line from the identity
line illustrate the bias of each estimation method in each data set.
The figures come in pairs on each page that follows. Each page presents the results for
one estimation method, with the top and bottom figures showing results for the Standard
EU and Random EU data sets, respectively. The pair of Figures A1-a and A1-b show results
for the NLS-M-L estimation method; Figures A2-a and A2-b show results for the ML-M-C
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method; Figures A3-a and A3-b show results for the NLS-U-E method; and Figures A4-a and
A4-b show results for the LAD-M-L method.
None of these four estimation methods are bias-free for both the Standard EU and
Random EU data sets, and this is the primary finding of this appendix. The method NLS-U-E
is biased towards finding inverse-s probability weighting for both data sets: In the case of
the Standard EU data I suspect this is because this method is just too parametrically
expansive for the sample size. By contrast, the NLS-M-L and ML-M-C methods are virtually
unbiased for Standard EU data, while they show the predicted bias when applied to the
Random EU data. As speculated, the LAD-M-L method provides unbiased (and
astonishingly tight) estimates for the Random EU data, but displays a quite noticeable bias
in the Standard EU data in a direction opposite to inverse-s probability weighting. The
latter finding (unexpected by me) may occur because the standard EU errors are drawn
from Beta distributions: Though those errors have a zero mean by construction, beta
distributions are generally skewed so that these errors would not usually have zero median
(as required for proper LAD estimation). In sum, none of these four estimation methods are
robust to the underlying source of randomness in the data generating process.
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Figure A1-a: NLS-M-L Weighting Estimates, Standard EU Data
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Figure A1-b: NLS-M-L Weighting Estimates, Random EU Data
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Figure A2-a: ML-M-C Weighting Estimates, Standard EU Data
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Figure A2-b: ML-M-C Weighting Estimates, Random EU Data
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Figure A3-a. NLS-U-E Weighting Estimates, Standard EU Data
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Figure A3-b. NLS-U-E Weighting Estimates, Random EU Data
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Figure A4-a: LAD-M-L Weighting Estimates, Standard EU Data
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Figure A4-b: LAD-M-L Weighting Estimates, Random EU Data
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